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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the set of bribe-proof rules in the context of the division
problem. The division problem consists of allocating a fixed amount of a perfectly
divisible good (or a task) among a group of n agents. A rule maps preference
profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. This is often considered as an
instance of an economy with private goods since an allocation is an n-dimensional
vector (specifying the amount allocated to each agent) and each agent only cares
about his own share.1 Sprumont (1991) shows that if each agent has single-peaked
preferences over his share, then the uniform rule is the unique efficient, strategy-
proof, and anonymous rule. A preference relation is single-peaked if it has a unique
maximal share and on each of its sides the preference relation is strictly decreasing.
Single-peakedness is a meaningful domain restriction if we interpret the division
problem as the reduced model of a more general problem where the good has a
fixed price (or the task is paid at a fixed wage); then, strictly increasing and convex
preferences in the two-dimensional space defined by the share of the good (or effort
on the task) and money will generate single-peaked preferences on the interval of
all possible shares. Strategy-proofness requires that no agent can obtain a better
share by misrepresenting his preference relation. Efficiency requires that no group
of agents can obtain better shares by redistributing their original shares. In the
context of an allocation problem where there is a perfectly transferable good it is
natural to combine both principles and to require that rules should be bribe-proof
in the sense that no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent
his preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain
a strictly preferred share.
Schummer (2000) proposes, for general economies with public goods and quasi-
linear utilities, a similar concept of bribe-proofness. Roughly, Schummer (2000)
shows that ex-post bribe-proof social choice functions turn out to be not very ap-
pealing since they are essentially constant in the sense that an agent’s payoff is never
affected by a change in any other agent’s reported valuations. But this is not surpris-
ing because firstly, bribe-proofness combines the principles of efficiency and strategy-
proofness and secondly, it is very well understood that in public goods economies
efficiency and strategy-proofness are incompatible unless social choice functions are
1See Sprumont (1995), Barberà (1996), and Barberà (2001) for three comprehensive surveys of
the literature on strategy-proofness in which the division problem plays a distinguished role.
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either dictatorial or restricted to operate in small preference domains.2 In contrast,
Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997) shows that the class of strategy-proof and effi-
cient rules in the division problem is very large. Specifically, they characterize the
set of sequential allotment rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and replace-
ment monotonic rules. Replacement monotonicity requires that if an agent receives
a larger share after changing his preference relation then all the other agents should
receive smaller shares.
In addition to Schummer (2000), very few papers have studied bribe-proofness.
Esö and Schummer (2002) examines whether a second-price auction with two bidders
(with private and independent values) is bribe-proof in the sense that a bidder may
pay the other bidder to submit a zero bid. In the context of the marriage model
with endowments Fiestras-Janeiro, Klijn, and Sánchez (2003) characterizes the class
of consumption rules under which optimal rules are immune to manipulation via
predonation of endowments.
The results of the paper and its organization are the following. After notation
and basic definitions, Section 2 presents the properties of efficient, strategy-proof,
tops-only, and bribe-proof rules as well as some of the basic relationships among
them. In particular, Lemma 1 states that all bribe-proof rules are efficient and
strategy-proof and Example 1 exhibits a strategy-proof and efficient rule that is
not bribe-proof. Example 2 points out that the class of bribe-proof rules is large
and contains rules that are not tops-only. Section 3 introduces the property of
replacement monotonicity and shows first that efficiency, strategy-proofness, and
replacement monotonicity are sufficient conditions for bribe-proofness. However,
Example 3 illustrates that these three properties are not necessary conditions for
bribe-proofness. Finally, we axiomatically characterize the full class of bribe-proof
rules by weakening replacement monotonicity when we show in Theorem 1 that a
rule is bribe-proof if and only if it is efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement
monotonic. This last property weakens replacement monotonicity by not requiring
anything whenever the agent that has changed his preference relation is receiving
his best share. Section 4 then describes the functional forms of a large class of rules,
called weak sequential rules, and in Theorem 2 we show that this class coincides with
the set of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules. Section 5 concludes by first showing
2For instance, in the context of a society choosing a level of a public good, Moulin (1980)
characterizes efficient and strategy-proof social choice functions as a particular subclass of gener-
alized median voter schemes whenever agents have single-peaked preference relations on the set of
possible levels of the public good and monetary transfers among agents are not admissible.
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the consequences of restricting in the definition of bribe-proofness (as in Schummer,
2000) the set of bribers to be a singleton. Finally, we discuss the consequences of
considering an alternative definition of bribe-proofness by allowing that the bribed
agent be indifferent between his original share and the share received once he is
compensated after declaring another preference relation.
2 Preliminary Notation and Definitions
Agents are the elements of a finite set N = {1, ..., n} where n ≥ 2. They have to
share a given amount of a perfectly divisible good that, without loss of generality,
we assume to be equal to 1. An allocation is a vector (x1, ..., xn) ∈ IRn+ such thatPn
i=1 xi = 1. We denote by A the set of allocations. Each agent i ∈ N has
a complete preorder Ri over [0, 1], his preference relation. Let Pi be the strict
preference relation associated with Ri and let Ii be its indifference relation. We
assume that agents have continuous preference relations in the sense that for each
x ∈ [0, 1] the sets {y ∈ [0, 1] | xRiy} and {y ∈ [0, 1] | yRix} are closed. Preference
relations are assumed to be single-peaked. That is, Ri is single-peaked if it has a
unique maximal share τ(Ri) ∈ [0, 1], the top of Ri, such that for any x, y ∈ [0, 1],
we have xPiy whenever y < x < τ (Ri) or τ (Ri) < x < y.
We denote by R the set of continuous and single-peaked preference relations on
[0, 1] . Preference profiles are n-tuples of preference relations on [0, 1] and they are
denoted by R = (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ RN . When we want to stress the role of agent i’s
preference we will represent a preference profile by (Ri, R−i) and by (RS, R−S) if we
want to stress the role of preference profiles of agents in S.
A rule is a function Φ : RN −→ A; that is,Pni=1Φi(R) = 1 for all R ∈ RN .
A minimal requirement on rules is efficiency. Given a preference profile R ∈ RN ,
an allocation x ∈ A is efficient if there is no z ∈ A such that for all i ∈ N , ziRixi,
and for at least one j ∈ N we have zjPjxj. Denote by E (R) the set of efficient
allocations.
A rule is efficient if it always selects an efficient allocation. Formally,
Definition 1 A rule Φ is efficient if for all R ∈ RN , Φ (R) ∈ E (R).
It is immediate to verify that, when preference profiles are single-peaked, efficient
rules ration out all agents in the same side of their tops. That is, for each R ∈ RN :
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"X
j∈N
τ(Rj) ≤ 1
#
=⇒ [τ(Ri) ≤ Φi (R) for all i ∈ N ]
and "X
j∈N
τ(Rj) ≥ 1
#
=⇒ [τ(Ri) ≥ Φi (R) for all i ∈ N ] .
Rules require each agent to report a preference relation. A rule is strategy-
proof if it is always in the best interest of an agent to reveal his preference relation
truthfully. Formally,
Definition 2 A rule Φ is strategy-proof if for all R ∈ RN , all i ∈ N , and all
R0i ∈ R, Φi (Ri, R−i)RiΦi (R0i, R−i).
In addition to efficiency and strategy-proofness we are specially interested in
rules that preclude the possibility that a group of agents gain by reallocating their
shares after one of them misrepresent his preference relation. Formally,
Definition 3 A rule is bribe-proof if for all R ∈ RN , all i ∈ N , and all R0i ∈ R
there are no S ⊆ N and (tj)j∈S such that i ∈ S,
P
j∈S tj =
P
j∈S Φj (R0i, R−i) , and
tjPjΦj (Ri, R−i) for all j ∈ S.
Lemma 1 All bribe-proof rules are efficient and strategy-proof.
Proof. The fact that a bribe-proof rule is strategy-proof follows immediately after
considering in the definition of bribe-proofness the particular case where S = {i}.
Assume Φ is not efficient; that is, there exist R ∈ RN , i ∈ N , and (x1, ..., xn) ∈ A
such that xjRjΦj (R) for all j ∈ N and xiPiΦi (R) .Take T = {k ∈ N | xk 6= Φk (R)}.
Define T1 = {k ∈ T | xk > Φk (R)} and T2 = {k ∈ T | xk < Φk (R)}. Observe that
T = T1 ∪ T2 and i ∈ T . Without loss of generality assume that i ∈ T1. Then, there
exists at least one agent j ∈ T2. Since Ri and Rj are single-peaked, τ (Ri) > Φi (R)
and τ (Rj) < Φj (R). Therefore, there exists ε > 0 sufficiently small such that
τ (Ri) > Φi (R) + ε and τ (Rj) < Φj (R) − ε. Define S = {i, j}, R0i = Ri,
ti = Φi (R) + ε, and tj = Φj (R) − ε. Notice that ti + tj = Φi (R) + Φj (R),
tiPiΦi (R), and tjPjΦj (R). Hence, Φ is not bribe-proof.
Example 1 below exhibits a strategy-proof and efficient rule that is not bribe-
proof.
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Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of agents and define the rule φ : RN → A
as follows. For all R ∈ RN ,
φ1 (R) = 1− φ2 (R)− φ3 (R) ,
φ2 (R) =
(
τ (R2) if 0R11
min {τ (R2) , 1− φ3 (R)} if 1P10,
φ3 (R) =
(
τ (R3) if 1P10
min {τ (R3) , 1− φ2 (R)} if 0R11.
Observe that φ is efficient and strategy-proof. To see that φ is not bribe-proof,
consider any R ∈ RN such that τ (R1) = 12 , 0P11, and τ (R2) = τ (R3) = 1.
Then φ (R) = (0, 1, 0). Let R01 ∈ R be such that τ (R01) = 12 and 1P10. Then
φ (R01, R−1) = (0, 0, 1). Consider S = {1, 3} and t1 = t3 = 12 . Since 12P10 and 12P30,
φ is not bribe-proof.
Lemmata 1 and 2 in Sprumont (1991) provides a fundamental one-agent result
about strategy-proof rules. The following Lemma, which will be intensively used
henceforth, adapts Sprumont’s result to rules with more than one agent.
Lemma 2 Let Φ be an efficient and strategy-proof rule. Then, for every i ∈ N
and R ∈ RN there exist 0 ≤ a(R−i) ≤ b(R−i) ≤ 1 such that Φi(Ri, R−i) =
med {a(R−i), b(R−i), τ(Ri)} .3
To be able to provide in Section 4 the functional form of a family of bribe-proof
rules, we will be specially interested in rules having the informationally nice feature
that they only require agents to reveal their best-shares since they only depend on
their tops. Formally,
Definition 4 A rule Φ is tops-only if for all R,R0 ∈ RN such that τ (Ri) = τ (R0i)
for all i ∈ N , Φ (R) = Φ (R0).
Note that the rule φ of Example 1 is not tops-only. The following example shows
that there are bribe-proof rules that are not tops-only.
3Given x, y, z ∈ [0, 1], not necessarily different, define med {x, y, z} as the number w ∈ {x, y, z}
such that # {w0 ∈ {x, y, z} | w0 ≥ w} ≥ 2 and # {w0 ∈ {x, y, z} | w0 ≤ w} ≥ 2.
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Example 2 Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of agents and define the no tops-only rule
ψ : RN → A as follows. For all R ∈ RN ,
ψ1 (R) = τ (R1) ,
ψ2 (R) =
(
min {τ (R2) , 1− ψ1 (R)} if 0R11
max {0, 1− ψ1 (R)− ψ3 (R)} if 1P10,
ψ3 (R) =
(
min {τ (R3) , 1− ψ1 (R)} if 1P10
max {0, 1− ψ1 (R)− ψ2 (R)} if 0R11.
To see that ψ is bribe-proof assume otherwise and let S be the corresponding set of
agents involved in the bribe. Observe that for all R ∈ RN , if ψi (R) = τ (Ri) then
i /∈ S. Therefore, 1 /∈ S.Without loss of generality, assume 0R11. If ψ2 (R) = τ (R2)
then S = {3} but this is a contradiction since for all R03 ∈ R, ψ3 (R03, R−3) = ψ3 (R) .
Assume ψ2 (R) < τ (R2) . Then, ψ3 (R) = 0, but this is a contradiction too, since
for any t2 with t2 > ψ2 (R), t2P2ψ2 (R).
3 An Axiomatic Characterization of All Bribe-
proof Rules
Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997) characterizes the class of efficient and strategy-
proof rules that satisfy the following additional requirement of monotonicity.
Definition 5 A rule Φ is replacement monotonic if for all R ∈ RN , all i ∈ N, and
all R0i ∈ R, if [Φi (R) ≤ Φi (R0i, R−i)] then [Φj (R) ≥ Φj (R0i, R−i) for all j 6= i] .
Remark 1 All replacement monotonic and strategy-proof rules are tops-only.4
Remark 2 There are strategy-proof and replacement monotonic rules that are not
efficient.5
Proposition 1 All efficient, strategy-proof, and replacement monotonic rules are
bribe-proof.
4Let R,R0 ∈ RN be such that τ (Ri) = τ (R0i) for all i ∈ N . By strategy-proofness,
Φi (Ri, R−i) = Φi (R0i, R−i) for all i ∈ N . By replacement monotonicity, Φj (Ri, R−i) =
Φj (R0i, R−i) for all j ∈ N\ {i}. Thus, Φ is tops-only.
5For instance, the constant rules.
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Proposition 1 will immediately follow from Remark 3 and Theorem 1 below and
therefore its proof is omitted. Example 2 at the end of Section 2 illustrates the
fact that efficiency, strategy-proofness, and replacement monotonicity do not fully
characterize the class of bribe-proof rules since ψ is bribe-proof (and, by Lemma 1,
efficient and strategy-proof) but it is not replacement monotonic.6 Observe that ψ
is not tops-only. Example 3 below shows that this equivalence does not hold even
in the class of tops-only rules.
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of agents and define Ψ : RN → A as
follows. For all R ∈ RN ,
Ψ1 (R) = τ (R1) ,
Ψ2 (R) =
(
min {τ (R2) , 1−Ψ1 (R)} if τ (R1) ≥ 12
max {0, 1−Ψ1 (R)−Ψ3 (R)} if τ (R1) < 12 ,
Ψ3 (R) =
(
min {τ (R3) , 1−Ψ1 (R)} if τ (R1) < 12
max {0, 1−Ψ1 (R)−Ψ2 (R)} if τ (R1) ≥ 12 .
By an argument similar to the one used in Example 2 it is easy to see that Ψ is
bribe-proof. Consider any R ∈ RN and R01 ∈ R such that (τ (R1) , τ (R2) , τ (R3)) =¡
1
4
, 1, 1
¢
and τ (R01) = 34 . Then, Ψ (R) =
¡
1
4
, 0, 3
4
¢
and Ψ (R01, R2, R3) =
¡
3
4
, 1
4
, 0
¢
,
which indicates that Ψ is not replacement monotonic.
In order to obtain a full characterization of all bribe-proof rules (by means of ef-
ficiency and strategy-proofness), we raise the following question: is there any weaker
notion of replacement monotonicity that together with efficiency and strategy-proofness
completely characterize the set of bribe-proof rules? Theorem 1 below answers the
question in the affirmative and Definition 6 identifies precisely this weaker concept
of replacement monotonicity.
Definition 6 A rule Φ is weak replacement monotonic if for all R ∈ RN , all i ∈ N,
and all R0i ∈ R, if [Φi (R) ≤ Φi (R0i, R−i) and Φi (R) 6= τ(Ri) or Φi (R0i, R−i) 6= τ(R0i)]
then [Φj (R) ≥ Φj (R0i, R−i) for all j 6= i].
Remark 3 All replacement monotonic rules are weak replacement monotonic.
6To see it, consider any (R1, R2, R3) ∈ RN and R01 ∈ R such that (τ (R1) , τ (R2) , τ (R3)) =¡
1
4 , 1, 1
¢
, 0P11, τ (R01) = 34 , and 1P
0
10. Then, ψ (R1, R2, R3) =
¡
1
4 ,
3
4 , 0
¢
and ψ (R01, R2, R3) =¡
3
4 , 0,
1
4
¢
, which means that ψ is not replacement monotonic.
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Now, we are ready to state and prove our axiomatic characterization of bribe-
proof rules in terms of efficiency, strategy-proofness, and weak replacement mono-
tonicity. Notice that, in contrast with Theorem 2 in Section 4, tops-onlyness is not
required here.
Theorem 1 A rule is bribe-proof if and only if it is efficient, strategy-proof, and
weak replacement monotonic.
Proof. ⇐=) Let Φ be an efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic
rule. Assume that Φ is not bribe-proof; i.e., there exist R ∈ RN , i ∈ N , R0i ∈ R,
S ⊆ N with i ∈ S, and (tj)j∈S such that
P
j∈S tj =
P
j∈S Φj(R0i, R−i) and
tjPjΦj(R) for all j ∈ S. (1)
Since Φ is efficient,
Φ(R) 6= Φ(R0i, R−i). (2)
We distinguish between two cases:
Case 1:
P
j∈N τ(Rj) ≥ 1.
By efficiency, Φj(R) ≤ τ(Rj) for all j ∈ N. By condition (1),
tj > Φj(R) for all j ∈ S. (3)
Moreover, since agent i is the bribed agent, Φi(R) < τ(Ri). By Lemma 2, there
exist a(R−i) and b(R−i) such that
Φi(R) = med {a(R−i), b(R−i), τ(Ri)} = b(R−i). (4)
By strategy-proofness of Φ, Φi(R)RiΦi(R0i, R−i).
• Assume Φi(R) = Φi(R0i, R−i). Because Φi(R) < τ(Ri), by weak replace-
ment monotonicity, Φ(R) = Φ(R0i, R−i), which contradicts condition (2).
• Assume Φi(R) 6= Φi(R0i, R−i). Because Φi(R) < τ(Ri), by Lemma 2 ap-
plied toR0i and condition (4), Φi(R0i, R−i) = med {a(R−i), b(R−i), τ(R0i)} ≤
b(R−i). Thus, Φi(R) > Φi(R0i, R−i). Since Φ is weak replacement mono-
tonic,
Φj(R0i, R−i) ≥ Φj(R) for all j 6= i. (5)
Then,
P
j∈N Φj(R) =
P
j∈N Φj(R0i, R−i), condition (5), and i ∈ S implyP
j /∈S Φj(R0i, R−i) ≥
P
j /∈S Φj(R). Thus,
P
j∈S Φj(R) ≥
P
j∈S Φj(R0i, R−i) =P
j∈S tj, which contradicts condition (3).
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Case 2:
P
j∈N τ(Rj) < 1.
Its proof is symmetric to the proof of Case 1, and therefore it is omitted.
=⇒) Let Φ be a bribe-proof rule (and hence, by Lemma 1, efficient and strategy-
proof). Suppose Φ is not weak replacement monotonic. Without loss of generality,
assume there are R ∈ RN , i ∈ N, R0i ∈ R such that Φi(R0i, R−i) 6= τ(R0i), and either:
1. Φi(R) < Φi(R0i, R−i) and there exists j 6= i such that Φj(R) < Φj(R0i, R−i), or
2. Φi(R) = Φi(R0i, R−i) and there exist j, j0 ∈ N such that Φj(R) < Φj(R0i, R−i)
and Φj0(R0i, R−i) < Φj0(R).
We will consider the two possibilities separately.
Case 1: Assume Φi(R) < Φi(R0i, R−i) and Φj(R) < Φj(R0i, R−i) for j 6= i. We distin-
guish between two subcases:
Case 1.1:
P
k∈N\{i} τ(Rk) + τ(R0i) ≥ 1.
By efficiency of Φ, τ(Rk) ≥ Φk(R0i, R−i) for every k ∈ N\{i} and τ(R0i) ≥
Φi(R0i, R−i). Because τ(Rj) ≥ Φj(R0i, R−i) > Φj(R), τ(Rj) > Φj(R). There-
fore, by efficiency of Φ,
τ(Rk) ≥ Φk(R) for every k ∈ N. (6)
Let S = {k ∈ N | Φk(R0i, R−i) < Φk(R)} ∪ {i}. Note that, by feasibility,
S 6= {i} and because Φj(R) < Φj(R0i, R−i), j /∈ S. Since
P
k∈N Φk (R0i, R−i) =P
k∈N Φk (R) and
P
k/∈S Φk (R0i, R−i) >
P
k/∈S Φk (R),
P
k∈S Φk (R0i, R−i) <P
k∈S Φk (R) . Therefore, by definition of S and condition (6), Φk(R0i, R−i) <
Φk(R) ≤ τ(Rk) for all k ∈ N\ {i}, and by hypothesis, Φi(R) < Φi(R0i, R−i) <
τ(Ri). Hence, there exists ε > 0 sufficiently small such that
ε <
X
k∈S
Φk(R)−
X
k∈S
Φk(R0i, R−i) (7)
and ε < τ (R0i)− Φi(R0i, R−i). Condition (7) can be rewritten as,
Φi(R0i, R−i)− Φi(R) + ε <
X
k∈S\{i}
Φk(R)−
X
k∈S\{i}
Φk(R0i, R−i).
For each k ∈ S\ {i} there exists αk > 0 such that αk < Φk(R)− Φk(R0i, R−i)
and X
k∈S\{i}
αk = Φi(R0i, R−i)− Φi(R) + ε. (8)
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Define ti = Φi(R0i, R−i)+ε (or equivalently ti = Φi (R)+[Φi(R0i, R−i)− Φi(R)]+
ε) and tk = Φk(R)−αk for all k ∈ S\ {i} . First, observe that, by definition of
ti and (tk)k∈S\{i}, Φk(R0i, R−i) < tk and Φi(R0i, R−i) < ti < τ (R0i) . Second,P
k∈S
tk =
P
k∈S\{i}
Φk(R)−
P
k∈S\{i}
αk + Φi(R) + [Φi(R0i, R−i)− Φi(R)] + ε
=
P
k∈S\{i}
Φk(R)− Φi(R0i, R−i) + Φi(R)− ε+ Φi(R)
+ [Φi(R0i, R−i)− Φi(R)] + ε
=
P
k∈S
Φk(R),
where the second equality follows from condition (8). Since tkPkΦk(R0i, R−i)
for all k ∈ S, it follows that Φ is not bribe-proof.
Case 1.2:
P
k∈N\{i} τ(Rk) + τ(R0i) < 1.
By efficiency of Φ, τ(Rk) ≤ Φk(R0i, R−i) for every k ∈ N\{i} and τ(R0i) ≤
Φi(R0i, R−i). But the hypothesis that Φi(R0i, R−i) 6= τ(R0i) implies τ(R0i) <
Φi(R0i, R−i). By Lemma 2,
Φi(R0i, R−i) = med {a(R−i), b(R−i), τ(R0i)} = a(R−i)
and
Φi(R) = med {a(R−i), b(R−i), τ(Ri)} ≥ a(R−i),
implying Φi(R0i, R−i) ≤ Φi(R),which contradicts the hypothesis that Φi(R) <
Φi(R0i, R−i).
Case 2: Assume Φi(R) = Φi(R0i, R−i) and there exist j, j0 ∈ N such that Φj(R) <
Φj(R0i, R−i) and Φj0(R0i, R−i) < Φj0(R). We distinguish between two subcases:
Case 2.1:
P
k∈N\{i} τ(Rk) + τ(R0i) ≥ 1.
By efficiency of Φ, Φk(R0i, R−i) ≤ τ(Rk) for every k ∈ N\{i} and Φi(R0i, R−i) ≤
τ(R0i). By assumption, Φi(R0i, R−i) 6= τ(R0i) and thus
Φi(R0i, R−i) = Φi(R) < τ(R0i). (9)
By efficiency of Φ,
Φj0(R0i, R−i) < Φj0(R) ≤ τ(Rj0). (10)
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By conditions (9) and (10), there exists ε > 0 such that Φi(R0i, R−i) <
Φi(R) + ε < τ(R0i) and Φj0(R0i, R−i) < (Φj0(R)− ε) < Φj0(R) ≤ τ(Rj0). Since
P 0i and Pj0 are single-peaked preference relations, (Φj0(R)− ε)Pj0Φj0(R0i, R−i)
and (Φi(R) + ε)P 0iΦi(R0i, R−i). Letting S = {i, j0}, ti = Φi(R) + ε, and tj0 =
(Φj0(R)− ε) we conclude that Φ is not bribe-proof.
Case 2.2:
P
k∈N\{i} τ(Rk) + τ(R0i) < 1.
By efficiency of Φ, τ(Rk) ≤ Φk(R0i, R−i) for every k ∈ N\{i} and τ(R0i) ≤
Φi(R0i, R−i). But the hypothesis that Φi(R0i, R−i) 6= τ(R0i) implies
τ(R0i) < Φi(R0i, R−i) = Φi(R). (11)
Since τ(Rj0) ≤ Φj0(R0i, R−i) < Φj0(R) it follows, from the efficiency of Φ, thatP
k∈N τ(Rk) ≤ 1 and
τ(Rj) ≤ Φj(R) < Φj(R0i, R−i). (12)
By conditions (11) and (12), there exists ε > 0 such that τ(R0i) ≤ Φi(R) −
ε < Φi(R0i, R−i) = Φi(R) and τ(Rj) < (Φj(R) + ε) < Φj(R0i, R−i). Since
P 0i and Pj are single-peaked preference relations, (Φi(R)− ε)P 0iΦi(R0i, R−i)
and (Φj(R) + ε)PjΦj(R0i, R−i). Letting S = {i, j}, tj = Φj(R) + ε, and ti =
(Φi(R)− ε) we conclude that Φ is not bribe-proof.
4 The Description of the Class of Bribe-proof and
Tops-only Rules
Sprumont (1991) characterizes the set of efficient, strategy-proof, and anonymous
rules. Surprisingly, this characterization shows that there is a unique rule satisfying
these three properties: the uniform rule.7 The uniform rule tries to divide the
amount of the good as equally as possible, but satisfying the bounds imposed by
efficiency. Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997) partly extends this result to the
non-anonymous case, by describing the class of all efficient, strategy-proof, and
replacement monotonic rules as the set of sequential rules (of which the uniform
7See Sprumont (1991), Ching (1992), Ching (1994), and Schummer and Thomson (1997) for al-
ternative characterizations of the uniform rule using instead of anonimity envy-freeness, symmetry,
equal treatment of equals, and minimum variance, respectively.
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rule is a special case). It is our purpose here to completely describe all bribe-proof
and tops-only rules.8 Theorem 2 below (together with our second final remark of
Section 5) will show that this class is strictly larger than the class of all sequential
rules identified in Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997).
Definition 7 A function g : A × RN → A × RN is weak sequential relative to
qL ∈ A and qH ∈ A if for any t ≥ 1 and any (qt, R) ∈ A×RN such that (qt, R) =
gt(q0, R) ≡ g(qt−1, R) the following conditions hold for all i ∈ N :
(i) If
P
j∈N τ(Rj) ≥ 1 then q0 = qH, and if
P
j∈N τ(Rj) < 1 then q0 = qL.
(ii) qti = τ(Ri) if
³
1−
P
j∈N τ(Rj)
´ ¡
qt−1i − τ(Ri)
¢
≤ 0.
(iii)
¡
qti − qt−1i
¢ ³
1−
P
j∈N τ(Rj)
´
≤ 0 if
³
1−
P
j∈N τ(Rj)
´ ¡
qt−1i − τ(Ri)
¢
> 0.
(iv) If min {τ(R0i), τ(Ri)} ≥ qt−1i and
P
j∈N τ(Rj) ≥ 1 or max {τ(R0i), τ(Ri)} ≤ qt−1i
and
P
j∈N τ(Rj) ≤ 1, then g(qt−1, R)) = g(qt−1, (R0i, R−i)).
(v) Let qn = gn(q0, R)) and q0n = gn(q0, (R0i, R−i)). Then,
if τ(R0i) < qni < τ(Ri) and
P
j∈N τ(Rj) ≥ 1 then q0nj ≥ qnj for every j 6= i;
if τ(R0i) > qni > τ(Ri) and
P
j∈N τ(Rj) < 1 then q0nj ≤ qnj for every j 6= i.
Definition 8 A rule Φ is weak sequential if there exist qL, qH ∈ A and a weak
sequential function g relative to qL and qH such that:
(Φ(R), R) = gn(q0, R) =
(
gn(qH , R) if
P
j∈N τ(Rj) ≥ 1
gn(qL, R) if
P
j∈N τ(Rj) < 1,
where gi(q,R) = g (g (...g (q,R)))| {z } .
i-times
Before stating and proving Theorem 2, we find useful to illustrate the definition
of weak sequentiality by an example.
Example 4 Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of agents and define the weak sequential
function g : A ×RN → A ×RN relative to qH = qL = (1, 0, 0) as follows: for all
8Example 2 indicates that the class of bribe-proof rules that are not tops-only is large and
arbitrary in nature.
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x ∈ A and all R ∈ RN , g (x,R) = (y,R) where y ∈ A is defined by
y1 =
(
τ (R1) if τ (R1) ≤ x1
x1 if τ (R1) > x1,
y2 =



τ (R2) if τ (R2) ≤ x2
x2 if τ (R1) > x1 and τ (R2) > x2
x1 + x2 − τ (R1) if τ (R1) ≤ x1 and τ (R2) > x2,
y3 = 1− y1 − y2.
To define the weak sequential rule Φ associated to g relative to qH = qL = (1, 0, 0)
consider any R ∈ RN . Then,
g1 ((1, 0, 0) , R) = ((τ (R1) , 1− τ (R1) , 0) , R) ,
g2 ((1, 0, 0) , R) = g
¡
g1 ((1, 0, 0) , R) , R
¢
= g ((τ (R1) , 1− τ (R1) , 0) , R) =
=
(
((τ (R1) , τ (R2) , 1− τ (R1)− τ (R2)) , R) if τ (R2) ≤ 1− τ (R1)
((τ (R1) , 1− τ (R1) , 0) , R) if τ (R2) > 1− τ (R1) ,
g3 ((1, 0, 0) , R)) = g
¡
g2 ((1, 0, 0) , R) , R
¢
= g2 ((1, 0, 0) , R) .
Thus, Φ(R) =
(
(τ (R1) , τ (R2) , 1− τ (R1)− τ (R2)) if τ (R2) ≤ 1− τ (R1)
(τ (R1) , 1− τ (R1) , 0) if τ (R2) > 1− τ (R1) .
Theorem 2 A rule is bribe-proof and tops-only if and only if it is weak sequential.
In the proof of Theorem 2 we will use the following two lemmata.
Lemma 3 Let Φ be a tops-only and bribe-proof rule and let R ∈ RN and R0i ∈ R be
such that
P
j∈N τ(Rj) ≥ 1,
P
j∈N\{i} τ(Rj)+τ(R0i) ≥ 1, and τ(Ri) > Φi(R) ≥ τ(R0i).
Then:
(3.1) Φi(R0i, R−i) = τ(R0i).
(3.2) For all j 6= i, Φj(R0i, R−i) ≥ Φj(R).
(3.3) For all j 6= i, if τ(Rj) = Φj(R) then Φj(R) = Φj(R0i, R−i).
Proof. (3.1) By Lemma 1, Φ is efficient. Therefore, for every j ∈ N
Φj(R) ≤ τ(Rj) (13)
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and
Φi(R0i, R−i) ≤ τ(R0i). (14)
By Lemma 2, condition (13) implies Φi(R) = min {b (R−i) , τ(Ri)} . By hypothe-
sis, τ (R0i) ≤ Φi (R), which implies Φi(R0i, R−i) = max {a (R−i) , τ(R0i)} . Therefore,
Φi(R0i, R−i) ≥ τ(R0i). Hence, condition (14) implies Φi(R0i, R−i) = τ(R0i).
(3.2) Assume there exists i0 6= i such that Φi0(R0i, R−i) < Φi0(R). Let S = {j ∈
N | Φj(R0i, R−i) > Φj(R)} ∪ {i}. Observe that i0 /∈ S. By feasibility, S 6= {i}. By
efficiency of Φ, τ(Rj) ≥ Φj(R0i, R−i) for every j 6= i. Therefore,X
j∈S
τ(Rj) >
X
j∈S
Φj(R0i, R−i) >
X
j∈S
Φj(R),
where the first inequality follows from the hypothesis that τ (Ri) > τ (R0i) and prop-
erty (3.1) just proved, while the second inequality follows from
P
j∈S Φj(R0i, R−i) +P
j /∈S Φj(R0i, R−i) =
P
j∈S Φj(R)+
P
j /∈S Φj(R) and
P
j /∈S Φj(R0i, R−i) <
P
j /∈S Φj(R).
Thus, similarly as in the Case 1.1 of the proof of Theorem 1, there exists (tj)j∈S
such that
P
j∈S tj =
P
j∈S Φj(R0i, R−i) and τ(Rj) ≥ tj > Φj(R) for every j ∈ S. But
this contradicts bribe-proofness of Φ because tjPjΦj(R) for every j ∈ S.
(3.3) Assume there exists j 6= i such that τ(Rj) = Φj(R) and Φj(R) 6= Φj(R0i, R−i).
By part (3.2), Φj(R) < Φj(R0i, R−i). Therefore, by hypothesis, τ(Rj) = Φj(R) <
Φj(R0i, R−i), which contradicts efficiency of Φ because
P
k 6=i τ (Rk) + τ (R0i) ≥ 1.
Lemma 4 Let Φ be a tops-only and bribe-proof rule and let R ∈ RN and R0i ∈ R be
such that
P
j∈N τ(Rj) ≤ 1,
P
j∈N\{i} τ(Rj)+ τ(R0i) ≤ 1 and τ(Ri) < Φi(R) ≤ τ(R0i).
Then:
(4.1) Φi(R0i, R−i) = τ(R0i).
(4.2) For all j 6= i, Φj(R0i, R−i) ≤ Φj(R).
(4.3) For all j 6= i, if τ(Rj) = Φj(R) then Φj(R) = Φj(R0i, R−i).
Proof. The proof is omitted since it follows an argument which is symmetric to
the one used to prove Lemma 3. ¥
Proof of Theorem 2. ⇒) Assume Φ is bribe-proof and tops-only. Define g :
A×RN → A×RN as follows: for every q ∈ A and R ∈ RN ,
g(q,R) =
¡
Φ(R(q,R)), R
¢
,
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where for all i ∈ N, R(q,R)i ∈ R is any preference relation with the property that ifP
j∈N τ (Rj) ≥ 1 then
τ
³
R
(q,R)
i
´
=
(
τ (Ri) if τ (Ri) < qi
1 if τ (Ri) ≥ qi,
and if
P
j∈N τ (Ri) < 1 then
τ
³
R
(q,R)
i
´
=
(
τ (Ri) if τ (Ri) > qi
0 if τ (Ri) ≤ qi.
We will show that g is a weak sequential function relative to qH = Φ(R1) and
qL = Φ(R0), where R1 and R0 are any pair of single-peaked preference profiles with
the property that for all i ∈ N , τ (R1i ) = 1 and τ (R0i ) = 0.
Assume
P
j∈N τ (Rj) ≥ 1 (the proof for the case
P
j∈N τ (Rj) < 1 is omitted
since it follows a symmetric argument). Set q0 = qH and define, recursively, the
following sets of agents:
S1 = {i ∈ N | τ(Ri) ≤ q0i } ≡ {i1, ..., is1}, (15)
and let Φ(R(q0,R)) = Φ(RS1 , R1N\S1) = q1.9 Now, define
S2 = S1 ∪ {i ∈ N\S1 | τ(Ri) ≤ q1i } ≡ S1 ∪ {is1+1, .., is2},
and let Φ(R(q1,R)) = Φ(RS2 , R1N\S2) = q2. This process will continue until, given
Sn−1 and qn−1, we define the set
Sn = Sn−1 ∪ {i ∈ N\Sn−1 | τ(Ri) ≤ qn−1i } = Sn−1 ∪ {isn−1+1, .., isn},
and we let Φ(R(qn−1,R)) = Φ(RSn, R1N\Sn) = qn.
Consider the preference relationRi1 and let Φ(Ri1 , R1−i1) = q0,1. BecauseΦ(R1) =
q0 = qH and q0i1 ≥ τ(Ri1), by Lemma 3, q
0,1
i1
= τ(Ri1) and
Φj(Ri1, R1−i1) = q
0,1
j ≥ q0j = Φj(R1) for j 6= i1. (16)
By conditions (15) and (16),
τ(Ri2) ≤ q
0,1
i2
. (17)
9Given a set Sk, sk denotes its cardinality.
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Consider the preference relationRi2 and let Φ(Ri1 , Ri2, R1−{i1,i2}) = q
0,2. By condition
(17) and Lemma 3, q0,2i1 = τ(Ri1), q
0,2
i2
= τ(Ri2), and q
0,2
j ≥ q
0,1
j for all j /∈ {i1, i2}.
Changing sequentially the preference relation of agents in S1 we obtain q0,1, ...., q0,s
1
with the properties that for every k with 1 ≤ k ≤ s1,
q0,kij = τ(Rij) for every j ≤ k (18)
and
q0,kj ≥ q
0,k0
j for every k
0 < k and j /∈ {i1, ..., ik}.
Notice that q0,is1 = q1.
Repeating this process for the sets S2, ..., Sn we obtain q2, ..., qn, similarly.
Now, we show that g is a weak sequential rule relative to qL and qH . Remember
that we are assuming that
P
j∈N τ (Rj) ≥ 1. Condition (i) in Definition 7 is clearly
satisfied because qH = Φ (R1). To show that condition (ii) holds assume qt−1i ≥
τ (Ri) . Then, by construction of qt, qti = τ (Ri). To check condition (iii), assume
qt−1i < τ (Ri). Then, by construction of qt, qti ≥ qt−1i .
To show that condition (iv) holds assume i /∈ St (hence τ (Ri) > qt−1i ) and
τ (R0i) > qt−1i . By definition, qt−1 = q0t−1. Then, and because qt = Φ(R(q
t−1,R)) =
Φ(RSt, R1N\St), q0t = Φ(R(q
0t−1,(R0i,R−i))) = Φ((R0i, R−i)St, R1(N\St)\{i}) and i /∈ St,
qt = q0t. Hence, g (qt−1, R) = g (qt−1, (R01, R−1)).
Finally, assume condition (v) does not hold; that is, there exist R∈RN , i ∈ N,
R0i ∈ R and j 6= i such that
τ (R0i) < qni < τ (Ri) (20)
and
q0nj < q
n
j . (21)
Notice that qn = Φ(R(qn−1,R)) = Φ(RSn, R1N\Sn) and, since i ∈ Sn,
q0n = Φ(R(qn−1,(R0i,R−i))) = Φ((R0i, R−i)Sn, R1N\Sn) =Φ(R0i, (R−i)Sn\{i}, R1N\Sn).
Then, by efficiency of Φ,
Φi(R0i, (R−i)Sn\{i}, R1N\Sn) ≤ τ (R0i) . (22)
Therefore, by conditions (20) and (21),
Φi(R0i, (R−i)Sn\{i}, R1N\Sn) < Φi(RSn, R1N\Sn)
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and
q0nj = Φj(R0i, (R−i)Sn\{i}, R1N\Sn) < Φj(RSn, R1N\Sn) =qnj .
Let S = {k ∈ N | qnk < q0nk } ∪ {i}. Because j /∈ S,
P
k∈S q
0n
k >
P
k∈S q
n
k . Therefore,
conditions (20) and (22) imply q0ni < q
n
i < τ(Ri). By definition of S and efficiency of
Φ, qnk < q0nk ≤ τ(Rk) for every k ∈ S\{i}. Then, as in the proof of Theorem 1, there
exists (tk)k∈S such that q
n
k < tk ≤ τ (Rk) and
P
k∈S q
0n
k =
P
k∈S tk, which contradicts
bribe-proofness.
It remains to be shown that gn(q0, R) ≡ (gn1 (q0, R) , gn2 (q0, R)) = (Φ(R), R).
Notice that gn1 (q
0, R) = g1(q
n−1, R) = qn = Φ(RSn , R1−Sn) where τ(Rj) > qnj =
Φj(RSn, R1−Sn) for every j ∈ N\Sn. The following claim concludes this part of the
proof.
Claim: Φ(RSn, R1−Sn) = Φ(R).
Proof: Let j ∈ N\Sn.Wewant to show thatΦ(RSn, R1−Sn) = Φ(RSn , Rj, R1−(Sn∪{j})).
Assume otherwise. Since, by Lemma 2, Φj(RSn, R1−Sn) = Φj(RSn, Rj, R1−(Sn∪{j})),
there exists j0 6= j such that Φj0(RSn, R1−Sn) < Φj0(RSn , Rj, R1−(Sn∪{j})). Let T = {i ∈
N | Φi(RSn, R1−Sn) < Φi(RSn, Rj, R1−(Sn∪{j}))}∪ {j}. Then, there exists (tk)k∈T such
that Φk(RSn , R1−Sn) < tk ≤ τ(Rk) and
P
k∈T tk =
P
k∈T Φk(RSn, Rj, R1−(Sn∪{j})).
Thus, Φ is not bribe-proof. Now, to conclude the proof of the Claim change, one by
one, R1j by Rj for every j ∈ N\Sn. ¥
⇐=) Let g : A × RN → A × RN be a weak sequential function relative to
qL ∈ A and qH ∈ A. We define Φ : RN → A as follows. For any R ∈ RN , set
Φ(R) = gn1 (q0, R), where
q0 =
(
qH if
P
i∈N τ(Ri) ≥ 1
qL if
P
i∈N τ(Ri) < 1.
The function Φ is clearly tops-only. Assume Φ is not bribe-proof; that is, there exist
R ∈ RN , S ⊂ N , i ∈ S, R0i ∈ R, and (tj)j∈S such that
P
j∈S tj =
P
j∈S Φj(R0i, R−i)
and for every j ∈ S, tjPjΦj(R). Without loss of generality we can assume thatP
j∈N τ(Rj) ≥ 1. By efficiency of Φ, τ(Rj) ≥ Φj(R) for every j ∈ N. Then tjPjΦj(R)
implies tj > Φj(R) for every j ∈ S. Thus,X
j∈S
Φj(R0i, R−i) >
X
j∈S
Φj(R) (23)
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and X
j∈N\S
Φj(R0i, R−i) <
X
j∈N\S
Φj(R). (24)
By Lemma 2, there exist 0 ≤ a(R−i) ≤ b(R−i) ≤ 1 such that
Φi(Ri, R−i) = med {a(R−i), b(R−i), τ(Ri)} .
Because τ(Ri) > Φi(R), Φi(Ri, R−i) = b(R−i). Since
Φi(R0i, R−i) = med {a(R−i), b(R−i), τ(R0i)} , (25)
Φi(R) ≥ Φi(R0i, R−i). LetΦ(R) = gn1 (qH , R) = qn andΦ(R0i, R−i) = gn1 ((R0i, R−i), q0) =
q0n. We will distinguish between two cases:
Case 1: τ(R0i) ≥ Φi(R) = b(R−i).Then, because qni = Φi(R) < τ(Ri), qni ≤ min{τ(R0i), τ(Ri)}.
But, condition (iv) implies q0nj = q
n
j for every j 6= i, contradicting conditions
(23) and (24).
Case 2: τ(R0i) < Φi(R). Then, by condition (25), Φi(R0i, R−i) < Φi(R), which implies
τ(R0i) = q0ni < qni < τ(Ri). Then, by condition (v), qnj ≤ q0nj for every j 6= i,
which contradicts condition (24).
5 Final Remarks
Before finishing the paper, two remarks about the definition of bribe-proofness are
appropriate. First, Schummer (2000) defines a bribe by requiring that the set of
agents S bribing agent i (who declares R0i) be a singleton. If we would ask for
this additional requirement our class of bribe-proof rules would be substantially en-
larged since there would be many bribe-proof rules without being weak replacement
monotonic. To see this, consider the case where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and R ∈ RN is
such that Φ1 (R) < τ (R1).10 Let R01 ∈ R be such that τ (R01) = Φ1 (R) − ε and
assume Φ2 (R01, R−1) = Φ2 (R) + 34ε < τ (R2), Φ3 (R01, R−1) = Φ3 (R) +
3
4
ε < τ (R3),
and Φ4 (R01, R−1) = Φ4 (R) − 12ε. Observe that Φ is not weak replacement mono-
tonic. Moreover, Φ is not bribe-proof (according to our definition) because there
10In order to make the argument more transparent and brief we omit the complete (and tedious)
description of Φ.
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exist S = {1, 2, 3}, t1 = Φ1 (R) + ε6 , t2 = Φ2 (R) + ε6 , and Φ3 (R) + ε6 such that
t1 + t2 + t3 =
P
j∈S Φj (R01, R−1) and tjPjΦj (R) for all j ∈ S. However, Φ would
be bribe-proof in the sense of Schummer because neither agent 2 nor agent 3 alone
can compensate agent 1 because with agent 1’s misrepresentation they gain 3
4
ε while
agent 1 loss is ε.
Second, our definition of bribe-proofness requires that, to be bribed, agent i
should be compensated (after declaring R0i) by agents in S\ {i} in order to make
him strictly better off than in his original situation Φi (R). If instead, we allow that
agents in S\ {i} compensate agent i only to let him be indifferent with the original
situation Φi (R), both definitions would be equivalent except when Φi (R) = τ (Ri).
But then, why should i be willing to accept the deal with S\ {i} of changing his
declaration to R0i to go back to his best share? However, if one insists in this
stronger notion of bribe-proofness Proposition 1 becomes a full characterization (or
equivalently, weak replacement monotonicity in Theorem 1 should be replaced by
replacement monotonicity). In addition, the description of the class of bribe-proof
and tops-only rules is obtained by replacing condition (v) in the definition of weak
sequential function g by the following condition:
(v0) Let qn = gn(q0, R) and q0n = gn(q0, (R0i, R−i)). Then,
if τ(R0i) < τ(Ri) and
P
i∈N τ(Ri) ≥ 1 then q0nj ≥ qnj for every j 6= i;
if τ(R0i) > τ(Ri) and
P
i∈N τ(Ri) < 1 then q0nj ≤ qnj for every j 6= i.
These rules are precisely the class of sequential rules identified by Barberà, Jack-
son, and Neme (1997) as the full class of efficient, strategy-proof, and replacement
monotonic rules.
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